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KIDNAPPING AN UGLY CHILD: 
IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? 
 
 
 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the creation of pragmatism, a great deal of ink has been spilt attempting to 
determine who is or is not a ȁrealȂ pragmatist, and what exactly that might mean. In 
recent scholarship, the division most commonly drawn is between the respective 
pragmatisms of Charles S. Peirce and William James. Peirce is seen as providing an 
account of pragmatism which is logically grounded, scientific in approach, and which 
offers an objective account of truth. As such, his pragmatism coheres with prevalent 
attitudes and projects in Anglo-ȱ¢ǯȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ
other hand, is presented as the kind which was rightly rejected by the founding 
analytic philosophers. It is woolly, nominalistic, and deeply subjectivistic. Whether 
intentionally or not, the argument goes, this version of pragmatism opens a door 
which leads to relativism and ȁvulgar RortyismȂ.1 
It is not only contemporary scholars who make this division, however. The first person 
to separate Jamesian and Peircean pragmatisms was in fact Peirce himself. In his 1905 
                                                 
1 Haack (1997). For examples of the division between these two types of pragmatism in recent 
scholarship, see in particular Misak (2013), and also Talisse (2010; 2013); Talisse and Aikin (2005); Haack 
(1977; 1997) and Mounce (1997) for a book length account of the split. Rorty makes the same split in the 
opposite direction, endorsing Jamesian pragmatism and arguing that Peirce did little more than give 
pragmatism its name (1982: 161). Klein (2013) and Levine (2013) are two contemporary figures arguing 
against this asserted divide from a Jamesian position. 
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Monist article, entitled ȁWhat Pragmatism IsȂ, Peirce distinguishes between 
ȁpragmatismȂ, a broad church which includes himself, James, Dewey, Schiller, as well 
as many historical figures, and ȁpragmaticismȂ, which was a more narrow and defined 
version of pragmatism to which he subscribed. Though surprisingly coy in the 
published article about who precisely he was trying to distance himself from (he was, 
after all, still to some extent reliant on James's fame and good will), elsewhere it is 
clear that his target was James and those who followed him. Peirce held that James 
applied the doctrine of pragmatism too liberally, and that his ȁremodellingȂ of 
pragmatism had prominent parts which Peirce held to be ȁopposed to sound logicȂ. 
(1908, CP6.482; cf. 1903, CP5.358n.1).2 It was this which drove him to ȁkiss goodbyeȂ to 
his ȁchildȂ pragmatism, and give birth to ȁpragmaticismȂ, a name which he held to be 
ȁugly enough to be safe from kidnappersȂ (1905, CP5.414). 
Despite this ugliness, it is precisely the aim of this paper to kidnap this term 
ȁpragmaticismȂ, and ague that it should be applied to James as well as to Peirce. The 
next section will move through the various criteria by which Peirce separates his own 
ȁpragmaticismȂ from pragmatism more broadly, focusing on his two Monist articles, 
both published in 1905, ȁWhat Pragmatism IsȂ and ȁIssues of PragmaticismȂ (§2). The 
subsequent sections will show that James meets these various criteria, looking in 
particular at James's position on metaphysical inquiry (§3), his stance on critical 
common-sensism (§4), and his realism about generals (§5). Though James himself was 
unconcerned to discern differences between various versions of pragmatism, 
preferring to focus on commonalities, by calling him a pragmaticist I hope to bridge 
the apparent divide between the two thinkers, and bring them into a more productive 
dialogue.  
 
§2. PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM 
 
At the beginning of the first Monist article, Peirce gives us the terminological rule by 
which he separates ȁpragmatismȂ from ȁpragmaticismȂ: 
the name of a doctrine would naturally end in -ism, while -icism might mark a 
more strictly defined acception of that doctrine (1905, CP5.413). 
                                                 
2 For abbreviations see bibliography. 
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Pragmaticism, then, is meant to be a more defined version of pragmatism. In a letter to 
the Italian pragmatist Mario Calderoni, Peirce presents the position he adopted in this 
article in the following way: 
I proposed that the word ȁpragmatismȂ should hereafter be used somewhat 
loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, Royce, and the rest of 
us, while the particular doctrine which I invented the word to denote, which is 
your first kind of pragmatism, should be called ȁpragmaticism.Ȃ The extra 
syllable will indicate the narrower meaning (1905, CP8.205). 
Peirce considers his ȁoriginalȂ conception of what he now calls pragmaticism to have 
a number of advantages over the pragmatisms which followed it, and sees it as 
immune to a number of the problems which less precise pragmatisms entail (1905, 
CP5.415).3 Pragmaticism, then, is the original, best, and most strictly defined version 
of pragmatism. 
Seeing as pragmaticism is a more refined example of pragmatism, we need to be clear 
on what Peirce means by ȁpragmatismȂ. Pragmatism, according to Peirce, emerges out 
of the application of a certain kind of scientific methodology to philosophy. When 
someone with an ȁexperimentalistȂ perspective is asked to assess the meaning of any 
assertion, they tend to do so in terms of the kinds of experiences we should expect if 
certain actions are performed (1905, CP5.411). It was this experimentalist perspective 
which lead Peirce to express the pragmatic maxim, which in 1905 he defines in the 
following way: 
if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which 
the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a 
complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it (1905, 
CP5.412).4 
A ȁpragmatistȂ in Peirce's terms is simply someone who holds some version of the 
pragmatic maxim. He is happy to attribute this definition to himself, James, Dewey, 
Schiller, Royce, and others (1905, CP5.414; 1905, CP8.205). 
                                                 
3 Peirce thinks that the ȁcapital meritȂ of his pragmaticism over other pragmatisms is that it ȁmore readily 
connects itself with a critical proof of its truthȂ (1905, CP5.415). See Hookway (2012: 197-234) for an 
examination of Peirce's attempts to ȁproveȂ pragmaticism. 
4 Peirce's original expression of the pragmatic maxim was in ȁHow to Make Our Ideas ClearȂ (1878, 
W3:266). Other, distinct expressions of the pragmatic maxim can be found throughout Peirce's work 
(cf. 1903, CP5.18; 1905, CP5.9; 1905, CP5.438). See Hookway (2012: 165-181) for an exploration of these 
different formulations.  
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Before giving an account of ȁpragmaticismȂ and its differences from pragmatism, 
Peirce is keen to assert that there are several ȁpreliminary propositionsȂ which we must 
adopt if our pragmaticism is going to be anything more than ȁa nullityȂ. He thinks that 
some of the other pragmatists (he mentions Schiller) include some of these 
propositions within their pragmatism, but Peirce aims here to present them precisely 
(1905, CP5.416). These propositions include a commitment to anti-foundationalism, 
anti-scepticism, and a theory of beliefs as habits of action. Let's take these in turn. 
Peirce consistently and explicitly rejects any philosophical methodologies which 
attempt to find some certain foundation for philosophical reflections, either through 
the ȁfirst impressions of senseȂ, or by ȁdoubting everythingȂ until we find something 
indubitable. The first strategy forgets that all our perceptions ȁare the results of 
cognitive elaborationȂ. The second misunderstands what ȁdoubtȂ really is (1905, 
CP5.416). 
True doubt, Peirce tells us elsewhere, is an unpleasant state of mind which is 
characterised by a feeling of unease and by an inability to continue with some actual 
conduct. It is defined by the interruption of some actual belief, and initiates an inquiry 
to regain a stable belief (cf. 1877, W4:247-8; 1905, CP5.510). Peirce often contrasts true 
doubt with what he calls ȁpaper-doubtȂ (e.g. 1906, CP6.498). These are doubts merely 
entertained in philosophical reflection, ȁas if ȱ ȱȃȱ¢ȱȱ¢Ȅȁ. But 
doubting is not easy. We cannot really doubt anything which we actually live by, and 
that which we do not actually doubt, we must ȁregard as infallible, absolute truthȂ 
(1905, CP5.416). Combined with his anti-foundationalism, then, Peirce presents a kind 
of anti-scepticism. 
Rather than looking for some indubitable foundation from which to start our 
philosophical inquiry, Peirce holds that: 
there is but one state of mind from which you can ȃȱȄǰȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȃȱȄȱȮ 
a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already 
formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would (1905, CP5.416). 
Asserting that beliefs which we do not actually doubt are held to be absolutely true 
does not commit Peirce to anti-faǯȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱhold them 
to be absolutely true until we find an experience which actually leads us to really doubt 
them. Real doubt is ȁonly called into being by a certain finite stimulusȂ (1905, CP5.416). 
Any belief is theoretically open to doubt, but we should not doubt our beliefs until we 
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have good reason to. Peirce likens his view of inquiry to walking on a bog, rather than 
walking on a bedrock of certain fact. The best we can say is ȁthis ground seems to hold 
for the present. Here I will stay until it begins to give wayȂ (1898, CP5.589).  
This talk of real doubt leads us to our next preliminary proposition: that belief is a 
habit of action. A belief is not a ȁmomentary mode of consciousnessȂ but is a ȁhabit of 
mind essentially enduring for some timeȂ. It is a disposition to a certain kind of 
conduct, in certain contexts. Doubt, on the other hand, is a ȁcondition of erratic 
activityȂ. One of the things which we are incapable of doubting is that we can influence 
our own habits. We can only consider ourselves and others responsible for conduct 
that is capable of being altered. Through preparation in imagination, and reflection 
after our actions, we alter our habits of conduct. The ideal end point of such a process 
is conduct which is marked by ȁan entire absence of self-reproachȂ (1905, CP5.417-8). 
So Peirce's full position is that belief is a habit of action which is subject to self-control.5 
These are the preliminary propositions which any pragmaticism has to adopt. Peirce 
now goes on to describe pragmaticism itself. The first assertion he makes is that 
pragmaticism is a type of ȁprope-positivismȂ (1905, CP5.423).6 This essentially means 
that pragmaticism is committed to the application of scientific methodology to the 
problems of philosophy. Peirce expressed such a position first in ȁThe Fixation of 
BeliefȂ, in which he argued that the method of science was superior to the method of 
a priori reasoning (1877, W3:242-57). It is through experiment and experience that we 
determine what is true, in any area of inquiry, and philosophy is no different. The 
application of the pragmatic maxim to philosophical problems allows us to determine 
which avenues of inquiry can reach experimentally testable conclusions, and which 
are ȁmeaningless gibberishȂ. Subsequently, ȁwhat will remain of philosophy will be a 
series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true 
sciencesȂ (1905, CP5.423). 
Calling pragmaticism a prope-positivism does not commit Peirce to any kind of 
materialism, naturalism, or claims about the reducibility of metaphysical propositions 
to propositions of a particular natural science. This is purely a position about the kind 
of methodology we should see as operative in our philosophical inquiries. 
Pragmaticism is distinguished from other positivisms, according to Peirce, by its 
holding three other doctrines: 
                                                 
5 For more on Peirce on (moral) self-control, cf. (CP1.591ff). 
6 Peirce had previously defined the prefix ȁpropeȂ as marking a ȁbroad and rather indefinite extension 
of the meaning of the term to which it was prefixedȂ (1905, CP5.413). 
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[W]hat distinguishes it from other species [of positivism] is, first, its retention 
of a purified philosophy; secondly, its full acceptance of the main body of our 
instinctive beliefs; and thirdly, its strenuous insistence upon the truth of 
scholastic realism (1905, CP5.423). 
It is these three criteria which are doing the work in distinguishing pragmaticism, not 
just from other positivisms, but also from other kinds of pragmatism.  
The first criterion concerns Peirce's assertion that pragmaticism does not reject all 
metaphysics, but ȁextracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give light 
and life to cosmology and physicsȂ (CP5.423). Peirce wants ȁpureȂ philosophy, such as 
logic, metaphysics, and ethics, to still be pursuable under pragmaticism, just pursued 
according to the scientific method. The second criterion concerns what Peirce calls, in 
his second 1905 Monist paper, ȁcritical common-sensismȂ, and which he connects with 
Scottish common-sense philosophy (1905, CP7.438-463). Elsewhere Peirce expresses 
this view by saying that pragmaticism ȁimplies faith in common sense and in instinct, 
though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticismȂ (1908, 
CP5.480). The third criteria asserts the validity of scholastic realism. In Peircean terms, 
this means realism about ȁhirdnessȂ. The pragmaticist must be a realist about 
generals, laws, continuity, possibility, and relation (cf. 1903, CP5.93ff).7 
This is not the place to rehearse Peirce's arguments for, and defences of, these various 
positions. The aim of this paper is to determine whether on these criteria Peirce could 
legitimately separate his own pragmatism from that of James. According to his 
published papers of 1905, Peirce has given us six criteria by which we can recognise a 
pragmaticist: 1), they must hold some version of the pragmatist maxim; 2) they must 
be committed to the ȁpreliminary propositionsȂ of anti-foundationalism, anti-
scepticism, and seeing belief as a habit of action susceptible to self-control; 3) they 
must be committed to scientific methodology in philosophical investigations; 4) they 
must be committed to the possibility of metaphysical inquiry; 5) they must be a critical 
common-sensist, and; 6) they must be a realist about generals. The rest of the paper 
will aim to show that James does in fact meet these criteria. 
I will assume that it is fairly uncontentious that James meets criteria 1) and 3). James 
expressed his own and Peirce's version of the pragmatic maxim repeatedly (1898, P: 
257ff; 1907, P: 29-30). He also held that philosophical investigations such as moral, 
religious, and metaphysical inquiries should be performed in a way quite analogous 
                                                 
7 cf. (Peirce, 1903, CP5.93ff; c.1888, W6:172ff). 
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to science (cf. 1891, WB: 157; 1896, WB: 8-9). Peirce agrees that he, James, and the other 
pragmatists agree on these two points (cf. c.1906, CP4.464-5). Both hold that a 
proposition's meaning is located in the future, and found by tracing what experiences 
would follow from it being true (cf. Peirce, 1905, CP5.427; James, 1907, P: 44ff). 
James also meets the second criterion. He consistently held a version of anti-
scepticism, on the grounds that we must reject it if we are to continue with our 
practices of philosophy, morality, and finding our lives meaningful (cf. 1891, WB: 141; 
1896, WB: 20; 28; 1909, MT: 107-8). He also rejects foundationalism, on the ground that 
no belief is self-certifying. Though we can become more certain of our beliefs as 
experience continues to confirm them, none of our beliefs can be shown to be so certain 
that they could not be revisable in the long run (1896, WB: 20-24). James linked 
pragmatism with the theory that beliefs were habits of action (1898, P: 259), and also 
held that these habits were subject to self-control (1890, PP1: 126ff; cf. 1892/1899, TT: 
47ff). These are all of Peirce's ȁpreliminary propositionsȂ. 
Operating on the fairly safe assumption that James accepts the first three criteria, I will 
spend the rest of the paper arguing that James meets the latter three.  
 
§3. JAMES AND METAPHYSICS (CRITERION 4) 
 
In his review of James's Principles of Psychology, Peirce criticises James for bracketing 
metaphysical questions out of his psychology (1890, CP8.60). James's move at the 
beginning of the Principles is to uncritically assume the propositions required for the 
science of psychology to proceed: that there are minds with thoughts and feelings, that 
there is a physical world, and that minds can know that world. All these assumptions 
can be called into question, but, according to James, ȁthe discussion of them [...] is 
called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this bookȂ (1890, PP1: 6). James 
restricts his psychology to the investigation of what he takes to be the empirical 
phenomena of feelings, thoughts, brain states, and their relations. Explanations of 
these phenomena which appealed to entities such as ȁsoulsȂ or ȁtranscendental egosȂ 
would be, again, metaphysical. So James aims to separate psychology as a natural 
science from metaphysics. 
IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? 
8 
 
ȂȱȱȱȱPrinciples might be taken as an example of him rejecting the 
possibility of usefully and scientifically inquiring into metaphysical propositions. 
However, it is not at all clear that James is denying that certain metaphysical 
considerations have no bearing on psychology, or that these considerations can be 
inquired into. Indeed, he suggests that his adopted assumptions, which appear to be 
metaphysical in nature, can be discussed in a separate metaphysical inquiry. This 
presumably means that such an inquiry could disprove, alter, or criticise these 
assumptions in a way that would effect empirical psychology. He just does not think 
that such an inquiry should be performed within empirical psychology. The aim 
appears to be the delineation of different avenues of inquiry, with the understanding 
that that they can influence each other when appropriate. 
In actual fact, James is quite clear from a very early point in his career that metaphysics 
is a necessary type of inquiry. For instance, in his 1879 version of ȁThe Sentiment of 
RationalityȂ, James says the following: 
Metaphysics of some sort there must be. The only alternative is between the 
good Metaphysics of clear-headed Philosophy, and the trashy Metaphysics of 
vulgar Positivism. (1879, EPH: 56-57) 
James makes at least two points about the necessity of pursuing metaphysical inquiry. 
The first concerns the idea that any account of the world will involve some 
metaphysics. Even apparently metaphysically innocent statements about ȁNatureȂ and 
ȁLawȂ involve taking an implicit ontological stance. We can either accept the 
unexamined materialist metaphysics of ȁvulgar positivismȂ without question, or we 
undergo some more careful philosophical investigation into metaphysics.  
James's second point about metaphysics concerns the necessity of metaphysical 
inquiry for practical life. Each of us carries around some metaphysical formula, some 
picture of the way we think the universe is, ȁunder [our] hatȂ (1879, EPH: 32). In most 
cases these metaphysical ideas are confused and unexamined. They tell us what we 
ought to expect from the world, what possibilities the universe allows for, and what 
meanings our actions can or cannot have within it. These metaphysical systems have 
real practical effects on our lives, and can lead to real practical and existential 
problems when they go wrong (cf. 1896, WB: 39-40). In is in some sense the 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱȱ ¡ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
metaphysical positions.  
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James's primary use of the pragmatic maxim, in later years, was its application to 
metaphysical and other philosophical problems in an attempt to elucidate the 
pragmatic issues at stake in certain cases. In some cases, this would lead to the 
discovery that there were no pragmatic or experiential effects, and so a dissolution of 
the problem. In other cases, the application of the maxim would discover the practical 
difference between the competing options so that they could be frankly evaluated and 
tested on their pragmatic effects (e.g., 1907, P: 45ff). In this regard, James seems to be 
following Peirce's suggestion that the application of the pragmatic maxim to 
philosophy would separate problems which can be solved through the experimental 
method, and those which were ȁmeaningless gibberishȂ (1905, CP5.423).  
Overall, James seems to be committed to the view that we should reject ȁvulgar 
positivismȂ, and its distaste for metaphysics, and consider a scientifically conducted 
metaphysical inquiry a necessary part of philosophy. 
 
§4. JAMES AND CRITICAL COMMON-SENSISM (CRITERION 5) 
 
It is in his second Monist article on this topic, entitled ȁIssues of PragmaticismȂ, that 
Peirce clarifies exactly what he means by ȁCritical Common-SensismȂ. Critical 
common-sensism is a variety of Scottish common-sense philosophy, but differentiated 
by six different characteristics. I'll briefly run through these characteristics now. 
Any common-sensism holds that there are certain foundational beliefs which are 
indubitable. For Peirce, this means indubitable in the sense that they are not currently 
susceptible to real doubt. The first character of critical common-sensism is that there 
are inferences as well as beliefs which are indubitable in this sense. The second is that 
common sense beliefs evolve over time as a result of human beings' interactions with 
an environment. The third character is that we should think of these beliefs as instincts 
which are indubitable when applied to contexts similar to those in which they 
evolved. The further from their appropriate contexts, the more vague these beliefs 
become, which is the fourth character of critical common-sensism. Fifth, the critical 
common-sensist not only revises these beliefs in the light of appropriate experience, 
but also seeks out experiences which might lead them to doubt these beliefs, before 
asserting them to be indubitable. And sixth, critical common-sensism is critical of itself, 
regular common-sensism, psychologism, and Kantianism (1905, CP5.440-452). 
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According to Peirce the ȁmost distinctiveȂ character of the critical common-sensist is 
the fourth, that ȁthe acritically indubitable is invariably vagueȂ (1905, CP5.446). Peirce's 
notion of vagueness is complex, but here it will be sufficient to connect vagueness with 
indeterminacy of application or interpretation. In an unpublished paper on the same 
topic, Peirce tells us that: 
[a] sign is objectively vague, insofar as, leaving its interpretation more or less 
indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience the 
function of completing the determination (c.1905, CP5.505). 
It is with this in mind that we should interpret Peirce's claim that the principle of 
contradiction does not apply to vague propositions. A vague proposition is still open 
to being interpreted in a number of definite ways. Until we know which determinate 
form a vague proposition should take, ȁit may be true that a proposition is true and 
that a proposition is falseȂ (1905, CP5.448).8  
Perhaps the simplest way to think about critical common-sensism is that it is the thesis 
that there are indubitable (in the sense of not available to real doubt) beliefs and 
inferences which are fallible (in the sense that they can be revised if we encounter the 
right kinds of experience) and vague (in the sense that they require more definite 
articulation in contexts further away from their original context), which form a basic 
foundation for many of our practices. 
James deals with the idea of common sense in his Pragmatism lectures. There he 
presents the view that every individual is an ȁextreme conservativeȂ in the sense that 
everyone naturally wants to preserve their beliefs. When we are compelled by 
experience to adopt a new belief, we try to minimize the effect this new addition has 
on beliefs which we already hold. However, once a new belief has been adopted, it 
tends to alter those which it is inferentially related to. In this way ȁ[o]ur minds [...] 
grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots spreadȂ (1907, P: 83). But the new facts 
we adopt are also altered by our old ones. Any novel experience is couched in the 
various assumptions and predications of our old beliefs. In this sense James gives us 
a kind of ȁNeurath's boatȂ image, not dissimilar to Peirce's bog metaphor: ȁ[w]e patch 
and tinker more than we renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it 
is also tinged by what absorbs itȂ (1907, P: 83). 
                                                 
8 See Hookway (2000: 135-158) for a more detailed elaboration of the subject of vagueness in Peirce, and 
the usefulness of vague propositions. 
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The ȁancient massȂ James is talking about here is our store of inherited beliefs, which 
James also terms common-sense. These are a class of beliefs which serve as the 
foundation of most of our everyday practices, and include in their number notions 
such as ȁa thingȂ, space and time, minds and bodies, and the difference between reality 
and fantasy. Though critical philosophy might be able to question these foundational 
elements of our thought, we cannot really doubt them in our practical lives. James 
takes the notion of a ȁthingȂ as an example. We might postulate in philosophy that a 
thing is just a ȁgroup of sense-qualities united by a lawȂ. Or we might in physical 
science learn that a thing is a swirling mass of atoms. Nonetheless, when ȁcritical 
pressure is relaxedȂ, and we leave the classroom or laboratory, we return to our 
common-sense ideas of things. ȁOur later and more critical philosophiesȂ, James tells 
us, ȁare mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thoughtȂ. 
It is only ȁminds debauched by learningȂ which even suspect common-sense beliefs of 
not being ȁabsolutely trueȂ (1907, P: 85-89). 
Despite their foundational role, these ideas are neither permanent nor absolute. Like 
Peirce, James holds them to be the result of generations of evolution. All common-
sense beliefs were once hypotheses, adopted by our primitive ancestors, applied to 
experience, and found to work so successfully that they became a fundamental part 
of our thought. As James puts it, ȁour fundamental ways of thinking about things are 
discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves 
throughout experience of all subsequent timeȂ (1907, P: 83).  The fundamentality of these 
beliefs makes them harder to question, and makes it less likely that we will encounter 
an experience which will make us doubt them. But we should not consider them 
infallible or self-evident, as the rationalistic scholastic philosophers did. No matter 
how old they are, we should still consider our common-sense beliefs to be ȁa collection 
of extraordinarily successful hypothesesȂ, and so subject to revision in appropriate 
circumstances. At least in philosophical inquiry, then, we should maintain a healthy 
ȁsuspicionȂ about common-sense ideas, rather than assuming their eternal veracity 
(1907, P: 90-94).  
These common-sense beliefs are the foundation of most if not all of our everyday 
practices, and are instrumental in the sense they allow us to make inferences and 
predictions about future experience. However, the application of these common-sense 
beliefs outside of the contexts in which they emerged leads to them being less 
determinate, and the inferences we make using them less secure. For instance, our 
concepts of time and space work perfectly well when we apply them to our daily 
practical lives. But when we apply our common-sense ideas on a cosmic scale, they 
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become ȁvague, confused, and mixedȂ. Accordingly, James tells us that ȁ[t]he moment 
you pass beyond the practical use of these categories [...] to a merely curious or 
speculative way of thinking, you find it impossible to say within just what limits of 
fact any one of them shall applyȂ (1907, P: 87-şŖǼǯȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȂȱ ȱ
concerning the indeterminacy of common-sense beliefs when applied to different 
contexts. 
We have some reason, then, to think that James holds a common-sensism which is just 
as ȁcriticalȂ ȱȂǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ
of us having no real reason to doubt them) beliefs and inferences, which are fallible 
(in the sense that they can be revised if we encounter the right kinds of experience) 
and vague (in the sense that they require more definite articulation in contexts further 
away from their original context), and which form a basic foundation for many of our 
practices. 
 
§5. JAMES AND SCHOLASTIC REALISM (CRITERION 6) 
 
Of the criteria which defined pragmaticism, scholastic realism was the most important 
to Peirce. He called himself a realist of an ȁextreme stripeȂ (c.1906, CP5.470), and 
suggested that ȁpragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not already 
convinced that there are real generalsȂ (1905, CP5.503). It is also the most important 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǯ 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ ȁthirdnessȂ. Being a 
realist about thirdness means being committed to realism about generals, laws, 
relations, possibility, and continuity. Rejecting realism about thirdness is what Peirce 
means by nominalism. Nominalism, according to Peirce, is a flawed doctrine, which 
has serious negative implications for both theoretical inquiry and practical life. 
Despite this, he saw it as being almost universally held among contemporary and 
historical thinkers. In a letter to James in 1904, Peirce described refuting nominalism 
as by far pragmatism's ȁmost important consequenceȂ (1904, CP8.258). 
Peirce has a consistent definition of what it means for something to be ȁrealȂ. The real 
is ȁthat whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to beȂ, and 
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is the object which is represented by that ȁopinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigateȂ (1878, W3:271-273). The difference between the 
scholastic realist and the nominalist, then, concerns whether or not laws, generals, and 
relations have this kind of reality. The realist will hold that they do, whereas the 
nominalist will hold that they are ȁȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǽǳǾȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ
minds are affected by the individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance 
or relationship whatsoeverȂ. Note that the scholastic realist need not hold that generals 
are independent of all thought, but only that they are independent of ȁhow you, or I, 
or any number of men thinkȂ and so are independent of ȁall that is arbitrary and 
individual in thoughtȂ (1871, W2:467-9).9 
In this final section I aim to show that James is a realist about generals in this sense, 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱpragmaticist. I shall do 
so by arguing that James is not a nominalist in three separate areas: he is not an 
ontological nominalist (§5.1); he does not have a nominalist view of perception (§5.2); 
and he is not an epistemological nominalist (§5.3). 
 
§5.1 ONTOLOGICAL NOMINALISM 
 
The central ontological thesis of nominalism is that reality at bottom is solely made up 
of discrete individuals, and that laws, generals, and relations are not real. As Peirce 
puts it, nominalists ȁrecognise but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing 
or factȂ (1903, CP1.21). 
James certainly centralises the importance of individuals in his philosophy, and this 
centralisation is often taken to be evidence of his nominalism. At least part of the 
reason James prioritised individuals in this way was his antagonism towards a specific 
version of Absolute Idealism. James argued (particularly in A Pluralistic Universe) that 
the monistic idealisms which exclusively privileged the general and the universal in 
their accounts of reality produced not only intellectual but also existential problems. 
However, denying the priority of generals is not the same as denying their reality.10 
                                                 
9 Cf. (Peirce 1909, CP6.453) for a later expression of the same view. 
10 ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȁ¡Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  generals were ȁȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻŗŞşŞǰȱŚǯŗǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǻc.1905, CP1.560). But, 
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In fact, when criticising traditional empiricisms and idealisms in his metaphysical 
work, James suggests that they have a common problem at root. And that problem 
looks a lot like nominalism. Both start from the assumption that reality is 
fundamentally dis-unified. Once we start from an assumption of atomism, the patterns 
and the unities which we experience become mysterious. Empiricism attempts to 
solve this problem by appealing to conventional habits of association, and idealism by 
introducing trans-experiential agencies to bind the disparate elements of our 
experience together (e.g. ȁThe AbsoluteȂ). Rather than starting from a false assumption 
of atomism, however, James points to the fact that our normal experience contains 
both continuities and discontinuities. We have no more reason, he argues, for 
assuming that one requires explanation any more than the other. If idealists and 
empiricists were consistent, they would feel compelled to produce philosophical 
explanations for the disunity as well as the unity found in our experience. James's 
strategy, on the other hand, is to assume that continuity and discontinuity are on an 
equal ontological footing: 
[I]f we insist on treating things as really separate when they are given as 
continuously joined, invoking, when union is required, transcendental 
principles to overcome the separateness we have assumed, then we ought to 
stand ready to perform the converse act. We ought to invoke higher principles 
of disunion, also, to make our merely experiential disjunctions more truly real. 
Failing this, we ought to let the originally given continuities stand on their own 
bottom (1904, ERE: 26-27). 
Without naming it, James is criticising classical empiricism and idealism here for 
assuming a nominalistic world picture. 
The main methodological postulate of James's ȁradical empiricismȂ is that we should 
treat everything which is experienceable as real, and vice-versa (1904, ERE: 22). 
James's assertion that we should take continuity to be just as real as discontinuity 
should be understood in this full metaphysical sense. Of course, any actual instance 
of experienced continuity might be shown to be false on subsequent examination. But 
there is no reason for rejecting the reality of all continuity.11 
                                                 
in his 1905 Monist articles, he does not claim that this extremity is required by the pragmaticist, only 
that realism is. 
11 The name which Peirce gives to realism about continuity is ȁsynechismȂ. James is quite clear that he 
holds this view, which he also attributes to Bergson. But Peirce disagreed on both James and Bergson's 
imprecise articulation of the theory (Letters from Peirce to James, 1909, quoted in Perry 1936, vol 2: 437-
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Most often when James talks about continuity in his radical empiricism papers, he 
refers to relations which obtain between features of experience. The relations which he 
has in mind are both conjunctive and disjunctive, and include nextness, similarity and 
difference, tendency, causality, purpose, identity, and continuation (cf. ERE: 23-4). The 
relations are themselves capable of being experienced, and so are just as real as 
anything else under the radical empirical hypothesis. James compares his own view, 
in which these relations are real and objective, with rationalism and traditional 
empiricism: 
[Relations] are undeniable parts of pure experience; yet, while common sense 
and what I call radical empiricism stand for their being objective, both 
rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are exclusively the ȁwork 
of the mindȂ (1905, ERE: 74). 
Radical empiricism is the view that reality demonstrates an experiential unity through 
relations and continuities which are themselves experiential and objective (1905, ERE: 
53; 1909, MT: 7), and which are independent of any individual or set of minds (1904, 
ERE: 40). And by presenting this view James is rejecting not only monistic idealism, 
but also nominalism.12 
As well as his commitment to objective relations between objects, James holds that we 
can discern general empirical ȁlaws of natureȂ, such as ȁheat melts iceȂ and ȁsalt 
preserves meatȂ. These are the kinds of empirical discoveries which, on a long enough 
time line, become common-sense beliefs in the pragmaticist sense (§5).13 James does 
not attribute the reality of such laws to the activity of human minds, but rather to the 
ȁhabitudes of concrete thingsȂ (1890, PP1: 1233), or the ȁimmutable habits which the 
different elementary sorts of matter followȂ (1890, PP1: 125). Like Peirce, then, James 
tends to attribute a principle of habit to matter as well as to organic beings, and is even 
                                                 
440). See Dea (2015) and Haack (1977) for more on the metaphysical distinctions between James and 
Peirce. 
12 According to Peirce himself, this radical empiricist view would disqualify James from being an 
ontological nominalist. He tells us that ȁnominalists generally do not admit that there is any similarity 
in things apart from the mind; but they may admit that this exists, provided that they deny that it 
constitutes any unity among the things apart from the mind. They cannot admit the latter and remain 
consistent nominalistsȂ (1902, CP6.377).  
13 James does hold that we must adopt our belief in the uniformity of nature as a whole on seemingly a 
priori grounds, before we can begin to inquire into nature as discover these more ȁproximateȂ laws (1890, 
PP 2: 1233-4). The belief in the uniformity of nature as a whole cannot be derived from experience, but 
rather serve as conditions for our inquiries into nature. As such, these beliefs must be adopted on the 
basis of what Peirce would call ȁregulativeȂ or ȁintellectualȂ hopes (cf. Peirce c.1890, CP1.405; c.1896, 
CP1.121; c.ŗşŖŗǲȱŝǯŗŞŝǲȱŝǯŘŗşǼǯȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱa priori, see Klein (2016). 
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occasionally tempted by a Peircean type cosmology in which these regularities grew 
over time from a period of relative chaos (1909, EPH: 369).14 Overall, James appears 
committed to the ontological reality of continuity, generality, laws, and habits. 
 
§5.2. PERCEPTUAL NOMINALISM 
 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
experience. This is because James thinks that experience is the ȁstuffȂ of which reality 
is composed (1904, ERE: 4). This might cause problems for the anti-nominalist reading 
of James, however, as he appears to hold a nominalist account of perception. The 
nominalist tends to think of immediate experience as a kind of ȁchaotic torrent of 
independent dataȂ which is subsequently categorised and organised by subjects on the 
basis of their personal interests. Nothing objective corresponds to the conceptual 
categorisations these subjects use to differentiate the originary experiential confusion, 
as they are merely the products of personal convenience. As such they cannot be ȁrealȂ 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŗŗǱȱŚ-5; cf. Peirce 1898 
CP4.1). 
It is easy to interpret James as this kind of nominalist when we remember his famous 
statement that experience in its immediacy is a ȁblooming, buzzing confusionȂ (1890, 
PP1: 462), and his assertions that we tend to make order out of this chaos by reference 
to our interests, and a certain amount of ȁarbitrary choiceȂ (1907, P: 119). According to 
James the ȁcuts we make [in the ȁperceptual fluxȂ] are purely idealȂ (1910, SPP: 32): 
the world we feel and live in, will be that which our ancestors and we, by slowly 
cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this, as the sculptor extracts 
his statue by simply rejecting the other portions of the stone. Other sculptors, 
other statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same 
chaos! (1879, EPs: 51-52). 
James's position seems to be that sensation or experience is at base chaotic, and that 
we make distinctions in this chaos according to our interests. 
                                                 
14 Cf. (Peirce 1898, CP6.209; CP6.262ff); (James 1904, ERE: 18; 1905, ERE: 74). 
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However, the story is not that simple. James is careful to never suggest that the 
distinctions we draw within our perception refer to nothing real. In his Principles, 
James does not tell us that we make distinctions through interest, but that we detect 
them by using our interest (1890, PP1: 481). Real distinctions in our environment are 
either practically salient to us, and so interesting, or they are not. Practical interest 
makes us attend to certain elements of the environment, and ignore others (1890, PP1: 
487). Through practice and training, we can learn to attend to distinctions within the 
environment which are not of immediate practical interest to us, but which are 
nonetheless still objective distinctions (1890, PP1: 481). 
Making these conceptual distinctions is necessary for navigating the sensible flux of 
pure experience. Without being able to distinguish between features of experience on 
the basis of some purpose, we would be lost in a sea of sensation. Using concepts on 
this sensible flux allows us to perform all kinds of functions and operations on raw 
experience which prove to be useful. Just like our experience, the concepts which we 
use to organise it can themselves appear to be disordered and chaotic. However, in 
time, we come to see that there are inferential relations which connect these concepts, 
independent of our opinions about them, and so we begin to trace order in the 
conceptual realm also (1904, ERE: 9-10). James treats concepts and the inferential 
relations between them as a ȁco-ordinate realmȂ of reality, just as real as percepts (1909, 
MT: 32). This is another sense in which James is committed to ontological realism 
about generals. 
What sense, then, should we make of James's assertion that the cuts we make in the 
sensible flux are ȁmerely idealȂ? In making this statement, James is contrasting the 
ideality of concepts with the real continuity of sensory experience. When they are not 
mistaken or misapplied, concepts respond to objective distinctions in our 
environment. But though concepts are useful, real, and track something objective, we 
should not think of concepts as definitively representing reality. Sensible reality is 
continuous, complex, and plural in a way that concepts are incapable of grasping. In 
Some Problems, James puts it this way: 
The great difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are 
continuous and concepts are discrete. Not discrete in their being, for conception 
as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their 
several meanings (1910, SPP: 32). 
Concepts are discrete from one another in a way that is not representative of sensible 
experience. Concepts can contradict each other, and we can trace their differences in 
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a relatively exact fashion. In sensible reality, on the other hand, the ȁboundaries are no 
more distinct than are those of the field of vision [...] whatever we distinguish and 
isolate conceptually is found perceptually to telescope and compenetrate and diffuse 
into its neighboursȂ (1910, SPP: 32). The cuts we make through conceptualisation, then, 
are ȁidealȂ in the sense that they make exact differences which are, in sensation, vague. 
James, then, does not seem committed to a nominalistic account of perception so much 
as he is committed to pluralistic account of experience. It is not the case that there are 
no objective discriminations to be made in our experience, or that our concepts refer 
to nothing real. It is in fact the opposite: there are too many such distinctions for all of 
them to be detected and attended to, and they are continuous and vague in ways that 
concepts can often miss.15 No conceptual system will be able to completely grasp the 
totality of our sensory reality, because some information escapes any attempt at 
conceptualisation. We shape the world of our lived experience by attending to some 
objective discriminations, and not to others. 
 
§5.3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL NOMINALISM 
 
The nominalist does not believe that concepts and propositions about general laws 
can be judged to be ȁtrueȂ or ȁfalseȂ, but only ȁusefulȂ or ȁnot usefulȂ. Again, this is 
because there is nothing in reality which the propositions or concepts are true of. As 
Forster puts it: ȁfor nominalists, laws and general concepts are artefacts of 
economizing minds to which nothing in reality literally correspondsȂ (2011: 5). 
James is routinely criticised for his conception of truth for just this reason. James seems 
to suggest that truth is what is ȁexpedientȂ or useful for us to believe (1907, P: 106). As 
it appears possible to separate truth and usefulness, given the prevalence of useful 
false beliefs, critics tend to see James as being led to a highly subjectivist position in 
which it is legitimate for us to believe anything we find useful, regardless of its truth. 
This is not the place to deal with such a vexed topic conclusively. Here I aim only to 
indicate that James was not a nominalist in this regard. 
                                                 
15 Steven Levine makes the first point well in his recent article, where he says that ȁ[w]hat is important 
to realize is that for James the sensory flux is a much-at-onceness that contains a plenitude or 
overabundance of qualities and relationsȂ (Levine 2013: 129). 
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James's treatment of truth emerges from his application of the pragmatic maxim. He 
is arguing against people who explain truth by appealing to a proposition's ȁself-
transcendingȂ capacity to refer to an object beyond itself. James finds such talk 
metaphysically confusing, and in need of pragmatic elucidation (1904, ERE: 27; 1909, 
MT: 61). Pragmatist analysis suggests that the practical effects of some belief being 
ȁtrueȂ would be that it allowed us to operate successfully in the world, and that we 
would encounter no problems if we continued to act according to it.  A proposition is 
true if it would lead us through a series of experiences to a verification of it (e.g. 1904, 
ERE: 14; 1907, ERE: 146-7). James does not deny that concepts and propositions need 
to agree with reality. He just elaborates what that relation means pragmatically. It 
means to be put in ȁworking touchȂ with reality (1907, P: 102). 
Taking a concept to be true pragmatically involves making a series of predictions 
about what kinds of experiences we will encounter. So, to test a concept's truth, we 
can see if it is an accurate predictor of future experience. If our predications are 
successful, and in practical cases that means useful, then we have good reason for 
suspecting that the concept is true. James clarifies his position in The Meaning of Truth, 
where he where he calls himself an ȁepistemological realistȂ (1909, MT: 106), and 
argues that ȁthe very condition of [concepts] having [...] utilityȂ is that ȁtheir objects 
should be really thereȂ (1909, MT: 112). So, though James is committed to the position 
that usefulness is a marker of truth, he is also committed to the position that what is 
most useful, at least in the long run, is for our ideas to agree with reality.  
There is a second way in which James might be considered an epistemological 
nominalist. ȱ¡ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the truth of a concept is determined by the practical difference it makes within the 
experience of an individual. In Pragmatism, for instance, he states that the purpose of 
philosophy is ȱȱ ȱȁȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱ
this world-formula or that world-ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǻŗşŖŝǰȱ Ǳȱ řŖǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ
comparison, holds that truth is determined by what an indefinitely large community 
of inquirers would affirm or deny (1868, W2:239; cf. 1878, W3:284-5). This 
individualistic move by the pragmatists who followed him greatly concerned Peirce 
(1908, CP6.485).  

 ǰȱ Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱ ȱ
does, unlike Peirce, aim to provide a place for individuals within philosophical 
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inquiry.16 He allows individuals to generate novel hypotheses, challenge existing 
practices and institutions, and decide which hypothesis, out of a set of equally 
plausible and incompossible options, will be pursued (e.g. 1890, WB: 190ff). But the 
verification of these hypotheses always depends on whether or not the wider 
environment of ȁ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗŞŞŖǰȱ Ǳȱ ŗŞŚ-6). 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȁȱȱȱ¢Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ
experience of one individual were sufficient for the verification of a philosophical 
hypothesis, any questiȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȁȱ -ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗŞŞŘǰȱǱȱ Şŝ-8). 
James maintains this position in his mature work, asserting that the pragmatist defines 
truth in terms of what ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ Ȃȱǻ1909, MT: 9)ǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱȁȱȱȱ
Ȃǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
Ȃȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱǻŗŞşŜǰȱǱȱŘŚǼǯȱSo, though James habitually talks about individual truth, he 
consistently separates what appears and functions as true for us, in our individual and 
fallible opinion, from what would be found to be true in the experience of human 
beings in the long run. The latter is what James calls ȁabsolute truthȂ, meaning ȁwhat 
no farther experience will ever alterȂ (1907, P: 106; cf. 1909, MT: 143).17 
The aim here is not to prove or disprove James's pragmatic account of truth. The aim 
is only to show that there are no large differences between Peirce and James on this 
matter. In the very same Monist paper in which Peirce sets up his division between 
pragmatism and pragmaticism, we find Peirce asserting that we must talk about truth 
and falsity in the practical terms of doubt and belief: 
If your terms ȃtruthȄ ȱȃ¢Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience (as for example they 
 ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and 
good: in that case, you are only talking abȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽǳǾȱ ȱ
problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to 
                                                 
16 Peirce denies that individuals should challenge beliefs held by the community (1898, CP1.666), holds 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱȱȂȱǻŗŞŜŞǰȱŘǱŘŚŗ-242), and rejects the existence 
ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ¢ȂȱǻǯŗŞşŘǰȱŝǯśŝŗǼǯ 
17 There are still clear and interesting points of disagreement between James and Peirce in this area. The 
two thinkers obviously disagree on the nature and extent of individualȂ contribution to inquiry; on the 
kinds and breadth of experience which is considered relevant to philosophical inquiry (cf. Misak 2013: 
67-71); and on what counts as the right community for assessing philosophical beliefs (cf. Klein 2013).  
IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? 
21 
 
 ȱȱȃǰȄȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
belief unassailable by doubt (Peirce, 1905, CP5.416). 
Peirce is denying the same transcendental accounts of truth that James is. Belief for 
the pragmatist is a habit of action, and real doubt is the interruption of that habit. If 
we have a belief that works, then we hold it to be true, at least for us, and at least for 
now. An absolutely true belief would be one which allowed us to act successfully and 
which would never encounter a real doubt. None of this is different from James's 
position. 
Perhaps the biggest difference in expression between the two positions is that whereas 
Peirce talks about a true belief as one which would be unassailable by doubt, James 
often talks about a true belief as one which will actually not encounter problems. This 
subtle difference has serious consequences. In fact, one element of scholastic realism 
hinges on the difference. 
In later works, Peirce bemoans what he calls his first ȁnominalisticȂ expression of the 
pragmatic maxim. In ȁHow to Make Our Ideas ClearȂ, Peirce presented the view that 
a diamond is hard if nothing actually will scratch it: 
[L]et us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not be 
scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as 
of every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference 
between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test 
(Peirce 1878, W3:266). 
This position is nominalistic because it denies that there are general laws about 
diamonds which obtain even in the absence of actually being tested.  
The importance of the subjunctive over the indicative expression, then, is that it 
recognises that there are real generals and real possibilities, such that something would 
be the case if some event occurred, even if it actually does not. This is why Peirce later 
changes his view to say that any diamond which was destroyed before having been 
brought to the test should still be considered hard, because it would have resisted 
scratching had it been tested (1905, CP7.453).  
James did not tend to express his pragmatism with this distinction in mind, and he 
often favourably quoted Peirce's first ȁnominalisticȂ expression of the pragmatic 
maxim. This might lead us to suspect that James continued to hold the original, 
indicative interpretation of it. However, there are plenty of instances in which James 
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confirms that it is the second, subjunctive expression he would agree to. For instance, 
in expressing three different kinds of cognitive relation which can obtain between 
knower and known object, James suggests that one is that ȁthe known object is a 
possible experience either of that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive 
transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolongedȂ (1904, ERE: 27). In a reported 
interview of 1908, James explicitly tells his audience that ȁtruth is constituted by [some 
ȂǾȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȂ (1908, ML: 442). Seeing as 
James is a realist about cognitive relations of this kind, he is also a realist about 
possibility in the way Peirce's realism requires.18 
Overall, then, James appears to have rejected ontological, perceptual, and 
epistemological nominalism. He has shown himself to be a realist about generals, 
about continuity, about habits, and about relations. Therefore, I think we can conclude 
that James meets the sixth and final criterion Peirce sets out to be recognised as a 
ȁpragmaticistȂ. 
§6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the Monist papers of 1905, Peirce presents a detailed account of a more precise 
version of pragmatism he called ȁpragmaticismȂ. It was his aim in doing this to 
separate himself from other pragmatists, such as William James, whose expressions of 
pragmatism he found too broad or misapplied. This set the stage for scholars in years 
to come to separate Peircean and Jamesian pragmatisms, often on the grounds Peirce 
himself set out. In this paper I have argued that, in actual fact, James meets the six 
criteria Peirce set out in defining pragmaticism: James holds a version of the pragmatic 
maxim (criterion 1); he meets the ȁpreliminary propositionsȂ of anti-foundationalism, 
anti-scepticism, and holding that beliefs are habits of action (criterion 2); he applies 
the scientific method to philosophy (criterion 3); but nonetheless thinks subjects such 
as metaphysics and logic can be studied (criterion 4); he is a common-sensist of a 
critical sort (criterion 5); and most importantly he is a realist about generals (criterion 
6). We should, I conclude, be willing to call James a ȁpragmaticistȂ alongside Peirce. 
                                                 
18 James frequently expressed realism about possibility, chance, and novelty, usually against the 
determinist or the intellectual monist (1884, WB: 114ff; 1910, SPP: 76ff). He connected this realism with 
his theory of pluralism (1896, WB: 6; 1907, P: 78; 1910, SPP: 72-ŝśǼǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ
ȁ¢Ȃȱǻǯ 1902-3, ML: 268ff; 1909, PU: 153). 
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ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ, at times, express Peircean 
sounding theses, but question their consistency in his work. Misak, for instance, 
ȱȱ ȱȁȱȱȂȱJames expresses a very Peircean sounding account 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ  Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ
ȁǽǾȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ 
 ǰȱ g to Misak, 
JamesȂ works also contains a thread of subjectivism which exists in tension with his 
more sensible pragmatism (Misak, 2013: 53-60). No-ȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ ȱ
style often encourages misinterpretation. Nonetheless, in this paper I have argued that 
from his earliest work until his latest, James was keen to express a kind of pragmatism 
 ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯ It is my 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱstatements can 
and should be interpreted in line with this pragmaticism.19  
That said, the aim of this paper has not been to eradicate all of the differences between 
these thinkers. Their common pragmaticism aside, we would be hard-pressed to find 
two figures with more dissimilar philosophical temperaments. James was insistent on 
giving a role to the individual in his pragmaticism, sometimes at the expense of 
sounding subjectivistic. Peirce was insistent on privileging the general in his 
pragmaticism, sometimes at the expense of denying the role (and even the existence) 
of the individual. The two disagree about the types of experience that ought to be 
considered appropriate in philosophical inquiry, the nature of the relevant 
communi¢ǰȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱǯȱȱȱȱ
are interesting precisely because they are disagreements within the same 
philosophical approach. To see them as denoting a difference in kinds of pragmatism 
tends to block the road of inquiry, as it allows us to dismiss potentially productive 
disagreements as being irrelevant to whichever kind we prefer. Uniting James and 
Peirce on the grounds of pragmaticism means that their disagreements regain a sense 
of vitality and interest, and allows for new comparisons, challenges, and inquiries 
which will be relevant to both classical and contemporary pragmatism.20 
 
                                                 
19 Of course, fully defending this position is outside the scope of this paper.  
20 Acknowledgements removed for blind review. 
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